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Abstract
In neoclassical models, workers are classified a priori into discrimination groups. We develop
a probabilistic model of wage discrimination in which workers need not be classified a priori.
Our model is a generalization of the standard framework, whereas Becker’s model is an
extreme case. A second implication is that the traditional approach to measuring
discrimination (the Oaxaca–Blinder approach) must be modified to take into account this
probabilistic framework.
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1. Introduction 
We propose a nondeterministic model of wage discrimination in which workers need 
not be classified a priori into discrimination groups. In this sense, our model extends the 
neoclassical model of wage discrimination (see Becker, 1957 and Arrow, 1973) in 
which, typically, all females (or blacks) are assumed to be discriminated against. We 
show that Becker’s model is an extreme case of our model when workers are 
deterministically classified. A straightforward implication is that the traditional 
Oaxaca–Blinder approach (Oaxaca, 1973 and Blinder, 1973) to measuring 
discrimination needs to be revised.  
We start with some intuition that we formalize in subsequent sections. Suppose that 
being female, black, foreign or ugly are disadvantages according to employers’ 
preferences. Assume also that only an unknown critical number (three in our model), 
rather than all, of those characteristics need to be possessed for workers to be 
discriminated against. The idea behind this assumption is that the more ‘negative’ 
characteristics a worker has, the more likely is such a worker to be discriminated 
against.  
In Figure 1, workers are divided into two groups: nondiscriminated against workers 
(group 1) and discriminated against workers (group 2). If we adopt, for instance, a 
gender view, most discriminated against workers are female, although men who are 
black, foreign or ugly are also discriminated against. If all parties (employers, 
employees, government, judges, lawyers, researchers, and so on) have perfect 
information about the relevant characteristics used to classify workers, the Oaxaca–
Blinder approach to measuring discrimination is appropriate.  
However, this information is often known only by employers, sometimes by employees, 
but not by third parties, particularly for nonobservable characteristics such as subjective 
evaluations of beauty, empathy and other personal circumstances. This information 
problem cannot be solved by improving the quality of the data. Another source of 
unobservable information for third parties is that available surveys may not include 
relevant variables such as religion and political affinity. Furthermore, to avoid the 
penalties imposed by authorities, employers try to hide their discriminatory conduct by 
modifying their behavior. 
Given this asymmetric information problem, deterministic models may be biased. Thus, 
in Figure 1, neither are all females discriminated against nor are all males not 
discriminated against. Consequently, an antidiscrimination policy based on only one 
characteristic, such as gender, results in a misallocation of resources. This is because not 
all male and female workers are in groups 1 and 2, respectively. 
 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
Even if policymakers account for all observable variables (such as gender, race and 
nationality), the presence of nonobservable characteristics (such as beauty) reduces the 
efficacy of policy. This simple example reveals the potential of nondeterministic 
approaches that do not rely on a priori deterministic classifications of workers.  
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2. Theoretical Model 
 
We consider two possible cases. In the first case, the authorities do not prosecute 
against discrimination. Thus, there is no social control over discriminatory behavior and 
employers are relatively free to set wages and determine contracts. We show that this 
situation can be represented by a two-stage sequential game. In the second case, we 
introduce antidiscrimination policy, which gives rise to a three-stage sequential game. 
 
2.1 No prosecutions against discrimination  
Assume that there are two groups of workers based on employers’ preferences: 
nondiscriminated against workers (group 1) and discriminated against workers (group 
2). These groups comprise workers with mixed characteristics. Some variables are 
observable (such as race, age and gender), whereas others may only be known by 
employers. Therefore, groups are not directly observable by third parties. By contrast, in 
neoclassical models of discrimination, the strong assumption is made that there is 
perfect information about groups. This implies a deterministic classification of workers. 
In the first stage, discriminatory employers determine optimal contracts to maximize 
their utility. Utility, U, depends on profits (π) and aversion to workers from group 2 (v). 
Employer utility is represented by the following function: 
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where K is the amount of capital employed by the firm, and l1 and l2 denote the numbers 
of workers in groups 1 and 2, respectively. Normalizing the price of output to unity 
(without loss of generality) allows us to define profits as follows: 
 
rKlwlwKllFKll −−−= 22112121 ),,(),,(π              (2) 
 
where F is a strictly concave production function, r is the cost of capital, and w1 and w2 
denote wages in group 1 (for nondiscriminated against workers) and wages in group 2 
(for discriminated against workers), respectively. We assume that workers in both 
groups have the same human capital, and thus the same labor productivity, which is 
given by 
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because of discrimination. 
The aversion component depends on the number of workers in group 2 and is 
represented by the aversion function v(l2), where 0'
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restriction on the second derivative ensures that the function v is convex and, therefore, 
that utility (given by equation (1)) is increasing and strictly concave. 
In the second stage, employees may accept or reject the contracts, depending on the 
reservation wage.  
The first-order conditions for utility maximization are: 
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The first-order condition for capital is 0=−∂
∂ r
K
F . We do not refer to this condition in 
the rest of the paper, as it is not relevant for our analysis. From the equations in (3), we 
can determine l1 and l2 if an explicit utility function is defined.  
It is clear from (3) that employers pay higher salaries to nondiscriminated against 
workers; i.e., 21 ww > . The higher the marginal aversion to workers in group 2, the 
greater the wage discrimination. Discrimination disappears as v' approaches zero. 
Optimal conditions in (3) imply that the marginal utility of hiring an extra worker from 
either group at the equilibrium is zero. Furthermore, the marginal utility of exchanging a 
worker from group 1 for a worker from group 2 is also zero: the marginal benefit (the 
wage differential between the groups, w1 − w2) equals the marginal cost (v') at the 
equilibrium. Now we can analyze gender discrimination.1 
As explained above, discriminated against workers (from group 2) are not easily 
identified if wage discrimination also depends on other characteristics (such as age, 
nationality, religion and appearance); there is an asymmetric information problem 
relating to these variables. Although this does not mean that workers are unaware of 
being discriminated against, independent observers can only assign probabilities to this. 
Hence, we characterize groups 1 and 2 as male and female workers as follows: 
ffmm lplpl )1(1 −+≡  and ffmm lplpl +−≡ )1(2 , where pm and pf denote the 
probabilities of male and female workers being in groups 1 and 2, respectively, and lm 
and lf denote the numbers of male and female workers in the firm, respectively. Thus, 
group 2 may include men and group 1 may include women (see example above). 
Therefore, bias against women can be identified by comparing the estimated 
probabilities of males and females being discriminated against. (Prieto et al. (2006) 
estimate these probabilities and derive the associated wage equations by using finite 
mixture models.) 
Because both women and men may be discriminated against (belong to group 2), 
aversion, v, depends on the numbers of women, lf, and men, ml . If there is a bias against 
female workers, then, '' mf vv > , where 
f
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We can rewrite profits (given by equation (2)) in terms of male and female employment 
as follows: 
  
rKlwlwKllFKll ffmmfmfm −−−= ),,(),,(π                 (4) 
 
where the male average wage is [ ]21 )1( wpwpw mmm −+≡  and the female average wage 
is [ ]21)1( wpwpw fff +−≡ . 
Assuming that male and female workers have the same labor productivity and that the 
firm maximizes its utility function with respect to lm and lf, the first-order conditions 
are: 
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1 We focus on gender discrimination but the same analysis applies, mutatis mutandis, to race or any other 
kind of wage discrimination. 
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Although the equations in (5) yield the same equilibrium as those in (3), they enable us 
to determine the optimal values of lm and lf.   
Male and female average wages are: 
 
''
mm vFw −=                        
''
ff vFw −=                       (6) 
 
Therefore, there is discrimination against women in terms of average wages if and only 
if there is more aversion to women. Furthermore, the wage gap between equally 
productive men and women, given by '' mffm vvww −=− , is less than the wage gap 
between groups 1 and 2, given by 21 ww − . This is because wm and wf are convex 
combinations of w1 and w2. 
From (5), we derive the following probabilities: 
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Substituting '1 Fw =  and '21 vww =− (from (3)) into (7) yields )1('' mm pvv −=  and 
ff pvv
'' = . 
Given the above results, the following are equivalent: 
 
fmfmfm ppvvww <−≡<≡> 1''  
fmfmfm ppvvww =−≡=≡= 1''  
fmfmfm ppvvww >−≡>≡< 1''               (8) 
 
The interpretation of this result is intuitive: women are discriminated against in terms of 
average wages and probabilities if and only if there is greater aversion to women. The 
same applies to male workers if and only if there is larger aversion to men.  
Even when there is no bias against women ( '' mf vv = ), there could be discrimination (but 
not based on gender); i.e., it could be that 21 ww >  although fm ww = , fm pp −= 1  and 
mf pp −=1 . 
 
A particular case: the deterministic approach 
If all relevant variables on which discrimination is based are observable and known, our 
model without prosecution is equivalent to the so-called deterministic model, which is 
in turn equivalent to the neoclassical models of Becker (1957) and Arrow (1973). That 
is, the deterministic model is an extreme case of our probabilistic model.  
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Suppose that gender is the only relevant variable for discrimination. In this case, group 
1 is composed entirely of men and group 2 includes only women. Thus, l1 = lm, l2 = lf, w1 
= wm, w2 = wf and 1== fm pp . Furthermore, the only argument in the aversion function v 
is the total number of women, lf. Hence, 'mv  is zero and '
' vv f = . From (3) and using wm 
for w1, wf for w2 and 'fv  for 
'v , we obtain 0' >=− ffm vww . 
The nondeterministic model’s equilibrium, given by (7), implies 1== fm pp , and 
0' >=− ffm vww , as in the deterministic model. 
Therefore, the nondeterministic approach is a more general framework for 
understanding discrimination because one need not assume that all women are 
discriminated against. 
 
2.2 Prosecutions against gender discrimination  
Now we consider a government that prosecutes against gender discrimination. 
Employer preferences for female and male workers do not change when there is 
prosecution against discrimination. However, when maximizing expected utility, 
employers consider not only the disutility of hiring group 2 workers, but also the 
expected penalty to be paid. This affects the optimal numbers of female and male 
workers in both groups and reduces the gender wage gap. 
Formally, if the government tries to reduce gender discrimination, the penalties imposed 
should depend on the bias against female workers, '' mf vv − . However, because these 
parameters are not directly observable, they cannot be used by the authorities. The 
government could adopt a second-best antidiscrimination policy based on the 
participation of female workers and salary differentials. 
If the probability of inspection is q, the expected penalty imposed on employers who 
discriminate is: 
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where h(·) is the penalty function and δ is the female participation rate in the labor 
market.2, 3 Moreover, the total labor force in the firm, L , equals the sum of male and 
female workers, fm llL += . The penalty depends on the participation of female workers 
in the company relative to δ.4 Gender discrimination can be practiced not only by 
paying different salaries, but also by hiring fewer women. Consequently, the 
government imposes no penalty (sets h = 0) if and only if average salaries are equal 
( fm ww = ) and the firm’s female participation rate is at the reference level ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ = δ
L
l f . In 
                                                 
2 The parameter δ is a benchmark and can be defined as any social optimum in terms of female labor 
participation. 
3 There exists a maximum penalty h~  that reflects the impossibility of some penalties: either they could be 
excessive from an ethical point of view or they could be uncollectible. 
4 The penalty should also depend on the wage gap. However, firms are wage takers, so w1 and w2 are 
fixed and the gender wage gap depends only on pm and pf. 
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the penalty increases as the gender wage gap increases. 
The employer’s expected utility is represented by the following function:5 
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Under the assumption that labor productivity is the same for male and female workers, 
the first-order conditions are: 
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where *mw  and 
*
fw  are the corresponding equilibrium wages when there is prosecution. 
These wages are: 
 
2
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L
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Prosecution raises the average wage of women and lowers the average wage of men. 
The wage gap between male and female workers, ( )
L
hqvvww lmffm
'
''** ·−−=− , is lower 
than that when there is no prosecution against discrimination. This gap may even be 
reversed if expected penalty costs are sufficiently high. 
The equations in (11), together with the definitions 21 )1( wpwpw mmm −+≡  and 
21)1( wpwpw fff +−≡ , allow us to obtain the following probability parameters at the 
equilibrium: 
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5 We ensure that the expected utility function is strictly concave by assuming that the penalty function h(·) 
is convex; i.e., h(·) has a positive semidefinite Hessian matrix. 
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Comparing (7) and (13) reveals that prosecution against discrimination lowers the 
probability of a male worker being in group 1, but also lowers the probability that a 
female worker is in group 2. Furthermore, under prosecution, the following are 
equivalent: 
 
**'
'
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The left-hand sides of the expressions in (14) come from (12). The right-hand sides of 
(14) derive from (13). The interpretation of (14) is that a necessary and sufficient 
condition for discrimination against women (over wages and probabilities) is that 
employers are more averse to hiring women, net of the expected penalty costs, than they 
are to hiring men. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine the government’s optimal 
antidiscrimination policy. However, the optimal policy for a government that prosecutes 
against wage discrimination would minimize gender discrimination subject to the net 
resources available for prosecution. That is, the probability of inspection, q, and the 
penalty function, h, would depend on how averse the government is to gender 
discrimination and on the net costs of prosecution (information costs, inspection costs 
and administrative costs net of fine revenue). 
 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
In neoclassical models, workers are classified a priori into discrimination groups. In this 
paper, we developed a probabilistic model of wage discrimination in which workers 
need not be classified a priori. Becker’s model is an extreme case of our model. Another 
implication of our model is that the traditional approach to measuring discrimination 
(the Oaxaca–Blinder approach) must be modified to take into account this probabilistic 
framework. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of workers by characteristics. 
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